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The Supreme Court’s role in developing copyright law recently
has assumed a significance traditionally reserved for issues of
“high” constitutional import. The extension of copyright-type
1
protection to new technologies and new information products, the
2
increasing criminalization of copyright violations, and the
3
implications of copyright term extension for the First Amendment
† William L. Prosser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I
am grateful to Ken Port and Niels Schaumann for inviting me to participate in the
Conference on the Impact of the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Law
This Millennium, held at William Mitchell College of Law, April 24, 2004. Thanks
to Jim Chen and David McGowan for comments on an earlier draft, Michael
Stokes Paulsen for a long, helpful conversation about constitutional
interpretation, and Tomas Felcman and Eugene Sherayzen for valuable research
assistance.
1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
DMCA]; Database and Collections of Information Misappropriations Act, H.R.
3261, 108th Cong. (2003)), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited July 20,
2004).
2. See, e.g., No Electronic Theft Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2) (2000) (imposing
criminal liability on individual infringers without regard to profit motives); DMCA,
17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2003) (imposing criminal liability for violation of the antitrafficking provision of the anti-circumvention prohibition); Lydia Loren,
Digitalization, Commodification, and Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal
Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 835, 840 (1999).
3. Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Mark A. Lemley &
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48
DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
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and the public domain expose a complex and enduring mêlée over
the function of copyright in the digital age and a corresponding
concern about the scope of Congress’s power pursuant to the
4
Copyright Clause. With little historical documentation on the
5
Clause, but growing scholarly interest, Congress’s power over
intellectual property policy has not been subject to the level of
judicial or academic scrutiny usually attendant to matters of
constitutional application. In recent years, however, the legislative
expansion of copyright and the ubiquitousness of copyrighted
works, both to a large degree occasioned by digital networks, have
intensified the relationship between copyright and the First
Amendment while highlighting the less-explored relationships
between copyright and the Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power,
and other subjects of constitutional significance. The explicit
application of constitutional law analysis to copyright policy has
taken place almost exclusively within the context of First
Amendment considerations in efforts to determine limits on
copyright and, by extension, limits on Congress’s power to expand
6
copyright protection. The relationship of copyright to social and
economic welfare—matters that resonate less powerfully in wealthy
economies, but that appeal strongly to salient moments in the
7
chronicles of United States constitutional jurisprudence —has
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act);
David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT.
L. REV. 281 (2004) (rejecting the proposition that the First Amendment provides
any rational basis for limiting copyright).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Commentators use different names for this
constitutional provision, such as the Intellectual Property Clause, the Patent and
Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause, and the Copyright Clause. I will use the title
“Copyright Clause” throughout this article.
5. See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope
of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); L. Ray Patterson,
Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 365 (2000); Malla Pollack,
What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754
(2001).
6. Again, the bulk of this work has focused on the relationship between
copyright and the First Amendment. See C. Edwin Baker, Essay, First Amendment
Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) (identifying education as “perhaps the most important function” of state
and local governments). Historically, the role of copyright in promoting
education has been a weighty aspect of the public welfare element of copyright
regulation. Starting from the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, copyright
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largely been reserved to scholars dealing with the effect of strong
proprietary regimes on economic development in the developing
world. The current environment in the United States has provided
a valuable opportunity to consider how copyright policy affects
matters of broad socio-economic and political concern in
developed countries as well.
The three cases of the new millennium deal with different
aspects of copyright regulation—indeed, one only indirectly with
8
9
copyright at all. In New York Times Co. v. Tasini, the Court
considered the copyright interests of freelance authors whose
articles had been published without their authorization in an
electronic database by the New York Times. Section 201(c) of the
Copyright Act grants the owner of copyright in a collective work the
privilege only of “reproducing and distributing the contribution as
part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective
10
work, and any later collective work in the same series.”
The
question before the Court was whether the electronic publication
of a periodical in a database that offered users individual articles
isolated from the periodical as a whole was a proper exercise of the
§ 201(c) publisher’s privilege. The Court, in a 7-2 decision, opined
that the transfer of articles to a database was not similar to the
conversion from newsprint to microfiche, and held that databases
that store and retrieve articles separately “effectively override[] the
Author’s exclusive right to control the individual reproduction and
11
distribution of each Article . . . .”
The majority held fast to a
literal reading of the statutory text and disagreed with the
dissenting Justices that “revision” in the context of digital media
should mean something different than in print media.
12
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court addressed a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act

has been an engine to encourage “learning.” See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne,
ch. 19 (“An act for the encouragement of learning”). This focus was reflected in
various state copyright statutes. See, e.g., Rhode Island 1783 Copyright Act (citing
as one purpose “the improvement of knowledge”); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 186 (1968) (stating that the preambles to
early state copyright statutes provided that “the reason for [copyright] was to
encourage authors to produce and thus to improve learning”).
8. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
9. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2000).
11. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 503-04 (2001).
12. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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(CTEA), which extended copyright protection for existing and
future works by twenty years. The petitioner argued principally
that the CTEA fails to satisfy the constitutional mandate to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, and violates the “limited
times” provision of the Copyright Clause, as well as the First
Amendment. Eldred thus presented the Court with a direct
opportunity to determine the constraints imposed by the Clause on
Congress’s power to regulate copyright.
14
Finally, in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, the petitioner
released a video set it called “World War II Campaigns in Europe”
made from tapes of an original television series first produced by
Fox, but that were in the public domain. Dastar edited the series
and marketed the video sets as its own product. Fox and its
licensees brought an action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
which proscribes false designations of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact
15
likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the goods. The Court
held that § 43(a) does not provide a cause of action against a
person who uses a public domain work without attribution to the
author. The decision affirmed a vision of the public domain as a
resource for completely unconditional access to, and use of,
16
expired copyrighted works.
These three cases of the new millennium provide an
opportunity to consider copyright law in a broader constitutional
context, and to examine the role of the Supreme Court in the
development of copyright policy in a global digital environment.
Focusing principally on the Eldred case, I discuss why the Court
(and the judiciary in general), whose vigilance in the nineteenth
century gave us the legacy of the public domain, would now
seemingly retreat from active oversight of legislation that, in the
17
view of many, redefines the copyright bargain between authors
13. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102 (b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998).
14. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
16. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (acknowledging the “public’s right” to copy and use
works in which copyright has expired).
17. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 29, 54 (1994) (criticizing balance of rights between copyright owners and
public); Ted Bunker, Copyright Idea Emerges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2003, at 23 (“If
Congress isn’t entirely in the grip of Hollywood and the big media interests served
by the 1998 extension, it’s tough to see the evidence”); Adam Cohen, Book
Review, The Intellectual Imperialists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at 12 (criticizing power
of copyright holders to restrict public use of various works); Robert S. Boynton,
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and the public to the detriment of the latter. I conclude that the
Supreme Court has ostensibly remained stable in its treatment of
the Copyright Clause. The Court’s adherence to a strict textualist
approach to statutes enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause is
reconcilable with the literalism that dominated nineteenth century
copyright cases. Such textualism, and the deference to Congress
that it begets, is also fairly consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence
in matters of economic regulation. However, the nineteenth
century cases reflected concerns about the nature of copyright that
are no longer salient today. Thus, I argue that the Court’s modern
textualism actually serves to undercut the significant normative
principles that counseled literalism as the most faithful means for
achieving the welfare goals of the Copyright Clause in the previous
millennium.

I. COMPETENCY AND ORIGINALISM
The cautious conservativism of the Court in Eldred, Dastar, and
Tasini is noteworthy, in my view, primarily for the tension between
the Court’s insistence on literalism in its interpretation of the
copyright statute, and its abandonment of any inquiry into the
original intent behind the Copyright Clause. From a historical
perspective, originalism and textualism must be balanced if the
Court is to consider seriously the meaning and purpose of the
18
Copyright Clause. By eliding substantive analysis of the social
welfare effects of copyright and, instead, deferring to the
institutional competency of Congress, the Court failed to engage in
its most formidable and necessary task, namely, determining the
appropriate scope of congressional powers consistent with the basic
19
premise of the Copyright Clause.
As one nineteenth century
judge expressed it, “[u]ndoubtedly a large discretion is lodged in
the Congress with respect to the subjects which could properly be
included within the constitutional provision; but that discretion is
not unlimited. It is bounded and circumscribed by the lines of the
The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at 40 (criticizing recent
copyright laws as giving too much power to copyright holders).
18. But see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260-61.
19. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated recently, “[n]o doubt the political
branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but . . . this
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.” United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000).
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general object sought to be accomplished.”
The new
jurisprudence of deference in copyright matters, “constrained by
21
the language of statutes and the intent of Congress,” dispenses
with the fundamental challenge of delineating institutional roles by
treating as one and the same the constitutional objective and the
22
means by which Congress chooses to exercise its authority.
As I will elaborate later, this is a notable difference between
the nineteenth century cases and the modern cases leading up to
Eldred. The early courts took seriously the objectives of the
Copyright Clause, often invoking those objectives as the premise
23
Professor
for analysis of the legitimacy of the statute at issue.
24
Leaffer prefers a “pragmatic, instrumentalist” approach to
constitutional interpretation as the best means of promoting social
welfare, broadly defined in copyright parlance in terms of the
25
balance between the interests of owners and users. In my view,
constitutional jurisprudence “constrained by the language of
26
statutes and intent of Congress” yields a circularity that obfuscates
the central question whether a particular statute is a proper
exercise of a constitutional power. A statute should be evaluated in
light of the scope of the underlying constitutional grant—a scope
determined by a specific interpretive approach that is itself
informed by how the Court views its role in that particular subject
area. It seems clear that the current Court views copyright first and
foremost as a piece of economic regulation, with built-in
27
mechanisms to redress First Amendment concerns. But the
Copyright Clause may also involve matters with less-explored
constitutional implications, which only a constitutional vision of
copyright can help elucidate. For example, is it constitutional to
28
grant stronger copyright protection to foreign copyright owners?
20. J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow et al., 82 F. 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1897).
21. Marshall Leaffer, Life after Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of
Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597 (2004).
22. At heart, this is an issue that dates back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), and more generally, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
23. See infra pp. 1647-49.
24. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1598.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003).
28. This is arguably what Congress did when it restored the works of foreign
copyright owners pursuant to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828
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In what way does such restoration promote “progress” in the
United States? Would a statute that extends copyright protection to
oral literature or folklore in the United States violate the Copyright
29
Clause? The fixation requirement of copyright law is generally
regarded as consistent with the constitutional term “writings” in the
Copyright Clause. However, no international treaty requires
30
fixation for obtaining copyright protection. If Congress decided
to eliminate fixation to recognize the bounty of creative expression
existing or generated by minority groups in the United States,
whose cultural traditions are rooted in community identity and
shared traditions passed down orally through generations, would
such a statute be constitutional? Would it pass constitutional
muster if Congress passed the statute pursuant to an international
agreement?
Failure to provide a grand constitutional vision of the
Copyright Clause ignores the fact that copyright law, like other
economic regulation, may operate in ways that privilege certain
values, cultures, heritages, and types of expression over others, and
that it does so in a way that undermines other constitutional ideals
found in the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Viewed
strictly as a form of economic regulation, constitutional analysis of
copyright legislation falls significantly short of addressing the deep
cultural, political, social, and economic importance of copyright to
this and succeeding generations. This myopic vision of copyright
also ignores the growing use of the Foreign Affairs Power to
31
accomplish change in domestic copyright policy.
Further, it
leaves us with no meaningful criteria to evaluate whether a
particular legislative outcome is properly informed by or infused

U.N.T.S. 221 (Berne Convention), and failed to extend the same privilege to
United States works.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
30. Berne Convention, supra note 28, art. 2 (2) (leaving a fixation
requirement to the discretion of member countries). Neither the WIPO
Copyright Treaty nor the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) addresses fixation.
31. A recent opinion from the District of Columbia avoided the intersection
between the Treaty Power and the Copyright Clause, and evaluated the
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation under the latter.
See Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, Civ. Action No. 01-2220, 2004 WL
1278070 (D.D.C. June 10, 2004), at 1, 8-9. The court, applying Eldred, concluded
that restoration of copyright in foreign works pursuant to Section 514 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act “did not overstep Congress’ power under the
[Copyright Clause].” Id. at 1.
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with an identifiable constitutional value. Finally, it diminishes the
significance of the Court’s role in the development of modern
copyright law and, specifically, the public domain.
As epitomized by Eldred, there are no precise measurements
for the ideal of “progress” that is the objective of intellectual
property protection in the United States. And certainly, in related
32
issues involving property and liberty, or federalism, the Court’s
deference to the institutional competency of Congress has not
precluded an examination of the exercise of such competency
33
under the constitutional provision at issue. The Court’s failure to
address the meaning of the Clause purposively, or to determine
why rational basis deference was the appropriate standard of
review, raises directly the famous “footnote four” problem in United
34
States v. Carolene Products. Does the enormous influence of special
interest groups on copyright legislation and the diffuse nature of
“the public” together add up to something akin to “legislation
which restricts . . . political processes which can ordinarily be
35
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation . . .”?
This is a difficult question, because copyright law historically has
been the product of negotiation and compromise between special
32. Of course, this is part of the fundamental problem: Is copyright more
about personal rights and less about commerce or vice versa? This is one of the
classic dilemmas of intellectual property rights—not quite property but more than
trade regulation. The Slaughter-House Cases convey an early reflection of the
intractable relationship between property, liberty, and exclusive privileges. “But
we think it may be safely affirmed, that the parliament of Great Britain,
representing the people in their legislative functions, and the legislative bodies of
this country, have from time immemorial to the present day, continued to grant to
persons and corporations exclusive privileges—privileges denied to other
citizens—privileges which come within any just definition of the word monopoly,
as much as those now under consideration; and that the power to do this has
never been questioned or denied. Nor can it be truthfully denied that some of the
most useful and beneficial enterprises set on foot for the general good, have been
made successful by means of these exclusive rights, and could only have been
conducted to success in that way.” See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See generally
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (examining
copyright as a form of trade regulation).
33. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995). One could argue, of course, that second-guessing Congress in
matters of private property rights is an entirely different matter than doing so in
matters of states’ rights and the Court has a stronger history of engaging in the
latter.
34. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
35. Id.
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interest groups, dominated, of course, by the interests of copyright
36
37
owners. However, representatives of the “public interest,” such
as librarians, educators, and scientific organizations, have recently
played important roles in opposing the expansionist demands of
38
the content industry, both domestically and internationally.
While the playing field is by no means even, the point is that the
opportunity for participation in the legislative process and the
39
measure of success flowing from such participation weaken
arguments that copyright legislation is subject only to protectionist
interest group influence. Further, in light of previous term
extensions by Congress, the CTEA does not, on its face, fall within a
40
“specific prohibition of the Constitution.” But even if it did, it is
unlikely that granting term extension to all authors of existing and
future copyrights would “call for a . . . more searching judicial
41
inquiry” as may be directed to legislation that targets specific

36. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23, 135-63 (2001).
37. I am fully aware that this characterization is problematic. After all, the
grant of rights to authors is an inextricable aspect of the public interest. In this
context, I am simply referring to the efforts to preserve a balanced system between
owners and users of protected works.
38. J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 793,
824-26 (1999) (discussing the “unusual” direct participation of United States
scientific organizations in negotiations over the proposed database bill). See also
Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 374 nn.
32, 33 (1997) (noting how those who had opposed the Clinton Administration
digital agenda before Congress turned their efforts to WIPO and helped to
influence the negotiations toward a more balanced treaty). “They not only
successfully lobbied the Clinton administration, persuading it to moderate or
abandon parts of its digital agenda at WIPO, they also attended WIPO-sponsored
regional meetings to acquaint other states with their concerns about the draft
treaties, and went to Geneva in large numbers to participate informally in the
diplomatic conference as observers and lobbyists. These expressions of concern
found a receptive audience among many national delegations to the diplomatic
conference. In the end, none of the original U.S.-sponsored digital agenda
proposals emerged unscathed from the negotiation process, and at least one—the
proposed database treaty—did not emerge at all. Insofar as the copyright treaty
emanating from the diplomatic conference contains provisions addressing digital
agenda issues, these provisions reflect an approach that strongly resembles the
balancing-of-interests approach that has been traditional in U.S. copyright law.
The WIPO Copyright Treaty even affirms ‘the need to maintain a balance between
the interests of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education,
research and access to information.’ ”Id. at 374-75.
39. Id.
40. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
210 (2003).
41. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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groups of people. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
it is the very operation of the political process that produced the
42
CTEA, and some commentators have suggested that the
outworking of this process is a reason important enough to justify
43
the Court’s deference to Congress.
But I suspect that it was the very intractability of determining
“welfare” and “progress” that compelled the Court to treat Eldred
44
not as a case about the Copyright Clause per se, but merely as a
reflection of congressional judgment that adding another layer of
45
protection to an established copyright system was consistent with
the public good.
Once the Court acknowledged the
46
constitutionality of term extension, the effect of such extension
on the copyright balance easily became a matter of judgment about
where the appropriate lines should be drawn between owners and
the public. The majority did not view it as the Court’s role to
engage in such line-drawing or to second-guess Congress’s
47
This is not unique to copyright. For
competency to do so.
example, difficulty in defining the “public use” requirement of the
Fifth Amendment has led the Court to defer almost entirely to
48
Congress on this aspect of takings law. Even in areas where the
Court has actively developed a body of constitutional
interpretation, such as “due process” or “equal protection,”
deference to Congress is more likely as the claims at issue fall
further away from the core issues of procedure or discrimination
that are the nuclei of these two areas of constitutional

42. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331
(2003).
43. Id. at 2402.
44. The petitioners in Eldred did not argue that term extension itself was
unconstitutional, but rather that serial term extension was a violation of the
requirement that protection should exist for “limited times.”
45. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 (noting the various times Congress had
extended the copyright term).
46. The Court elided the interpretation of the Clause and focused instead on
the constitutionality of term extension per se, concluding that the CTEA was not a
violation of the Copyright Clause. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 (noting that “a
regime of perpetual copyrights ‘clearly is not the situation before us.’ ”)
47. See also United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938). The
Court noted that where the values of a particular legislation are debatable, the
decision belongs to Congress alone and “neither the finding of a court arrived at
by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be substituted for it.” Id. at
154.
48. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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49

jurisprudence.
Eldred was not as surprising or outrageous as it was
disappointing.
Many may have underestimated the path50
dependency created by previous term extensions, and by the
increased internationalization of copyright relations, which
inexorably raises standards of protection worldwide. These two
factors in themselves exert significant force in two areas of
constitutional jurisprudence where the Court is also fairly
deferential; namely, Congress’s authority pursuant to the
Commerce Clause and the Executive’s exercise of the Foreign
51
Affairs Power. This said, however, it should be noted that there
are zones of constitutional sensitivity even in these traditional areas
of deference. For example, judicial sensitivity to the Copyright
Clause is likely to be heightened significantly in instances where
legislation implementing treaty obligations introduces new rights
52
unfamiliar to, or in tension with, domestic copyright law. In my
view, such cases offer a stronger basis for assessing the boundaries
53
of congressional power under the Copyright Clause.
An
54
important case to watch in this regard is Golan v. Ashcroft.
In Golan, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the

49. I am grateful to Jim Chen for pointing this out.
50. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 (noting that previous term extensions did not
create perpetual copyrights). See also Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, Civ.
Action No. 01-2220, 2004 WL 1278070 (D.D.C. June 10, 2004) (affirming the
constitutionality of copyright restoration based on previous restorations by
Congress).
51. With respect to the Treaty Power, the Supreme Court held in Geofrey v.
Riggs: “The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of
the government . . . and those arising from the nature of the government itself
and the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids . . . .” 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). Modern Supreme
Court jurisprudence recognizes constitutional limitations to the Treaty Power that
apply to all exercises of federal power, but remains very broad. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 185 (1996).
52. At the very least, legislation that destabilizes the traditional scheme of the
copyright system is likely to give rise to a heightened standard of judicial review.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186; see also Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F.
Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). But see Luck’s Music Library at 9-13 (noting that
Congress has historically exercised its powers to restore copyright).
53. The district court opinion in Eldred states as much and was not disturbed
by the Supreme Court. If anything, the Dastar opinion in my view affirms this
point. See infra at 1650-52 (discussing Dastar).
54. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D.Colo. 2004).
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CTEA and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). Section
56
514 of the URAA amended the Copyright Act by restoring
copyright protection to qualifying works of foreign origin whose
authors lost their United States copyrights for failure to comply
57
with then-existing copyright formalities. Pursuant to the URAA,
58
the Copyright Act was amended to allow restoration of copyright
for the length of time the work would have been protected had it
59
not lost its copyright status. The plaintiffs in Golan argued that
copyright restoration restricts their right to free speech because
they could no longer publish works in which copyright had been
restored, and violates their Due Process rights under the Fifth
Amendment by unfairly trammeling on their expectations to be
60
able freely to use works already in the public domain. The district
court allowed all but the term extension claim to withstand the
61
government’s motion to dismiss. Importantly, the court held that
the plaintiffs’ First Amendment argument was adequately
distinguished from the one made in Eldred, thus suggesting that the
Golan court may apply a higher standard of scrutiny to assess the
62
constitutionality of § 104A of the Copyright Act. Although the
court expressed some skepticism about the plaintiffs’ Due Process
argument, it considered seriously the claim that copyright
restoration is a violation of the Copyright Clause. Citing the district
court opinion in Eldred, the court noted that the Supreme Court’s
63
precedent in Graham v. John Deere Co. would preclude Congress
64
from extending copyright to a work in the public domain.
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Golan employed a similar strategy
55. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.
(2000)).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (h)(6)(C)(I) (2000).
58. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976, codified at
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000).
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (a)(1)(B) (2000).
60. Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
61. Id. at 1221.
62. Id. at 1220.
63. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (holding that “Congress
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available”).
64. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d at 377 (2002) (observing that Graham “would
indeed preclude Congress from authorizing under [the Patent and Copyright]
Clause a copyright to a work already in the public domain”).
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used by the government in Eldred by pointing out previous
legislative acts, which specifically precluded the extension of
65
copyright to works in the public domain.
Coupled with the
explicit acknowledgment in Dastar of a “federal right to copy and to
66
use expired copyrights,” other dicta noting the “carefully crafted
67
bargain” between authors and the public, and statements averring
to the limits of authorial/inventor prerogatives, I believe Golan
offers an opportunity to contest the precedential weight of
copyright expansionism with the strong legacy of preserving a
robust public domain.
An additional factor to consider is a little-acknowledged
footnote in the first international agreement negotiated by the
United States allowing restoration of foreign works in the public
domain. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement
68
(NAFTA), qualifying motion pictures of Mexican and Canadian
69
authors can be restored. However, the treaty also notes that such
restoration would only proceed if it was not deemed to be
70
unconstitutional.
It would appear, then, that the government
itself was initially uncertain as to the constitutionality of copyright
restoration. When restoration was not challenged under NAFTA,
Congress dipped the proverbial “entire legislative foot” by
expanding restoration to all copyrightable works of eligible foreign
71
authors. Given this background of the modern copyright
restoration impetus, I am far from confident that the fairly limited
history of copyright restoration to domestic authors presumptively
confers a constitutional legitimacy on copyright restoration to
foreign authors. The fact that such discriminatory restoration is
based on an exercise of the Treaty Power makes the restoration
regime more—not less—constitutionally suspect, and certainly calls
72
for a higher level of judicial scrutiny.
65. Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
66. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34
(2003).
67. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33-34.
68. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Annex 1705.7, 32
I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/
legal/index_e.aspx?articleid=170#An1705.7 (last visited July 20, 2004).
69. Id.
70. Id. (stating “This obligation shall apply to the extent that it is consistent
with the Constitution of the United States . . . .”).
71. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. 5, § 514, 108
Stat. 4809 (1994).
72. Cf. Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, Civ. Action No. 01-2220, 2004
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At least one district court has confronted, without answering,
the question of whether the United States can constitutionally
obligate itself to a treaty that requires enforcement of a copyright
that falls short of the requirements for copyrightability established
73
by the Copyright Clause.
This question, along with another
equally difficult issue—whether Congress can accomplish under
the Commerce Clause what is forbidden by the Copyright Clause—
74
has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court. The
weight of the Court’s acknowledgment of the public domain in
Dastar, the importance of historical practice emphasized in Eldred,
and the culture of strict interpretation that is evident in Tasini all
suggest that the constitutional challenge in Golan is more likely to
meaningfully address the constitutional questions that many hoped
Eldred would answer.
The Supreme Court’s deference is a striking feature of this
new millennium. It was, after all, the Court that almost singlehandedly created the doctrinal underlay of the “public domain.”
The most salient tributaries to the public domain are the result of
the Court’s active policing of congressional power, and its careful
interpretation of the Copyright Act in light of the constitutional
mandate of the Copyright Clause. In the landmark decision of
75
Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court drew the distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable ideas.
The
idea/expression dichotomy today is one of the key doctrines
76
contributing to the public domain, and is codified in § 102(b) of
WL 1278070 (D.D.C. June 10, 2004).
73. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
74. The weight of scholarly opinion is that the Copyright Clause imposes
limits on the exercise of congressional authority pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection
Legislation: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in
Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539-52 (2000); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna
Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause As an
Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL L. REV. 1119 (2000); William Patry, The
Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999). In United States v. Moghadam, the court
held that protecting unfixed performances pursuant to the Commerce Clause is
not “fundamentally inconsistent” with the fixation requirement in the Copyright
Clause, but might violate the “limited times” provision. 175 F. 3d 1269 (11th Cir.
1999). The court ultimately did not consider this issue because it had not been
raised by the plaintiff during the district court proceedings.
75. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
76. Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 8384 (1989) (explaining importance of idea/expression dichotomy in keeping a
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77

the Copyright Act. Pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement, the
idea/expression dichotomy is now also a principle of international
78
copyright law. Other limitations on the rights of owners, such as
the first sale doctrine, have antecedents in some of the earliest
79
decisions of the Court. Like the idea/expression dichotomy, the
80
first sale doctrine has also been codified in the Copyright Act.
The lower courts in the nineteenth century also played a
significant role in guarding the boundaries of the Copyright
81
82
Clause. For example, in Clayton v. Stone & Hall, the court denied
the copyrightability of a daily publication of current market
83
prices. The court looked first at the Copyright Clause to
determine what was protectable and held that, since the statute in
question was passed pursuant to this constitutional imperative,
copyright protection had to be consistent with the promotion of
84
science and the useful arts. Similarly, the District Court in Burrow85
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony took very seriously the limitations
imposed by the Constitution to hold that Congress did not have the
86
constitutional right to protect photographs by copyright.
Although this rigid interpretation might be an example of the
87
inflexibility that Professor Leaffer eschews, the Supreme Court’s
decision in the case was nevertheless soundly literalist in its
88
interpretation of the constitutional clause. This same literalism is
store of “raw materials” in public domain).
77. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
78. See TRIPS Agreement, art. 9 (2), supra note 77.
79. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) (“Recent cases in
this Court have affirmed the proposition that copyright protection under the
Federal law . . . depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed
in pursuance of the authority conferred under . . . the Federal Constitution . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
81. See, e.g., Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872).
82. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. 999 .
83. Id. at 1003.
84. According to the court, “it would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view
of the sciences to consider a daily or weekly publication of the state of the market
as falling within any class of them . . . . The act of Congress is ‘for the
encouragement of learning,’ and was not intended for the encouragement of
mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences . . . .” Id.
85. Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 17 F. 591 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
86. Id. at 592.
87. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1598.
88. See Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
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evident in the Court’s resoluteness about digital technology in
Tasini. Indeed, the Court’s literalism in Tasini is remarkably
consistent with the Court’s treatment of new technology in White89
Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. There, the Court held that a
player piano roll was not a “copy” of the musical composition it
represented. Congress responded to this decision by legislative
90
change in the 1909 Copyright Act.
Outside of the technology context, nineteenth and early
twentieth century judicial interpretations were quite literal, often
drawing on historicism to constrain the operation of the Copyright
91
Act, particularly with respect to the basic right to copy. In Ricordi
92
and Co. v. Mason, the court construed § 1 of the 1909 Copyright
Act and held that a booklet that described various opera scenes was
not an infringement of copyrights in the underlying librettos.
According to the court, stories of the defendant were neither
abridgements nor infringements on plaintiff’s copyright because
they did not interfere with the right to “publish, reproduce or sell
the operas.” The alleged infringing stories, according to the court,
gave “just enough information to put the reader upon inquiry,
precisely as the syllabus of a law report, the review of a book, or the
93
description of a painting induces the reader to examine further.”
The defendant was simply making use of the copyrighted material;
copyright protection, the court held, does not extend so far as to
94
prevent this use.
Similarly, the mechanical reproduction of
sounds of a performance of copyrighted music was not considered
95
an infringement of the copyright in the composition. On the
other hand, lithographic reproductions of copyrighted works were
96
held to constitute infringements of the underlying works. Between

89. White-Smith Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
90. Subjecting mechanical reproductions of musical works to a compulsory
licensing system. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
91. See, e.g., Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (C.A. D.C. 1901) (holding that
mechanical reproductions of sounds of a performance of copyrighted music were
not an infringement of the copyright in the composition); Ricordi & Co. v. Mason,
201 Fed. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (construing § 1 of the 1909 Copyright Act to allow
descriptions of various opera scenes of the plaintiff’s works because the
descriptions were not abridgements, and did not interfere with the exclusive right
to publish, reproduce, or sell the operas).
92. Ricordi, 201 F. 182.
93. Id. at 183.
94. Id. at 185.
95. Stern, 17 App. D.C. 562.
96. Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
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1856 and 1870, new laws granted performance rights to musical
97
98
and dramatic works; and protected photographs or negatives,
dramatic compositions, painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary,
and models or designs intended to be perfected as works of fine
99
art. Translation rights and the right to dramatize novels were also
100
included in the corpus of copyright protection.
At one time or
another, all of these activities had previously been determined by a
court to be noninfringing activity, most usually because the works
did not infringe a specific right.
The literalism that characterized the nineteenth century
copyright cases evidenced vigilant attempts to reinforce the
statutory roots of the new copyright, all while ensuring that
Congress’s exercise of power was consistent with the Copyright
Clause. The scope of congressional power and the means of
exercising that power were distinct in the eyes of the judiciary, and
deference to the means chosen by Congress was the result of
satisfaction with the constitutionality of the legislation. In this
sense, Eldred was inconsistent with the Court’s historical approach
101
to the Copyright Clause. The nineteenth century courts were
literal precisely so they could affirm that copyright protection was a
product solely of statutes, and had no claim outside of the welfareenhancing objectives established by the Constitution and
implemented by Congress. The modern literalism goes in the
opposite direction, affirming Congress’s power no matter how or if
remotely related to the objectives and ideals of the Clause’s
purpose.
II. SHIFTING BOUNDARIES: CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE TREATY POWER
Scholars and commentators have criticized the Dastar opinion
for undermining an already weak compliance scheme for the

97. The Copyright Revision Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (music);
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856) (drama).
98. Act of March 3, 1865, § 1, 13 Stat. 540 (1865).
99. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 (1870).
100. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870).
101. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291
(1907); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903);
Higgens v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 430-31, 433 (1891); Thompson v. Hubbard, 131
U.S. 123, 151 (1889); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 642 (1834).
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protection of moral rights under the Berne Convention. At the
time of Berne accession, the Berne Convention Implementation
Act (BCIA) stated that existing United States law, such as “various
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, various state
103
statutes, and common law principles[,]” was sufficient to protect
moral rights. The Court in Dastar declined to find a right of
attribution under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act for works in the
public domain reproduced by others. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Scalia stated that to find such a right of attribution
would create a series of “mutant copyright laws” that would
trammel on the “federal right to copy and use expired
104
copyrights.”
This explicit reference to a positive right to freely
access and use public domain works is an important
acknowledgment by the Court of the centrality of the public
domain to the copyright system. Ironically, the Court further
noted that extending § 43(a) to works in the public domain
renders limitations on copyright (in visual and other kinds of
105
works) superfluous.
Although Congress enacted a very limited
version of moral rights protection after ratification of the Berne
106
Convention, the Court deferred to Congress’s ambivalence to
moral rights by observing that “[w]hen Congress has wished to
create such an addition to the law of copyright, it has done so with
much more specificity than the Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of
107
‘origin.’ ” In reviewing the right of attribution granted under the
102. Tyler T. Ochoa, Amicus Brief, Introduction: Rights of Attribution, Section
43(A) of the Lanham Act, and the Copyright Public Domain, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 911
(2003) (questioning how Dastar can be reconciled with moral rights under the
Berne Convention); Janet Fries & Michael J. Remington, Beware of Mutant
Copyright: Justice Scalia Issues a Warning in the Dastar Decision, IP LAW & BUSINESS,
Sept. 2003, at 70 (questioning whether Dastar leaves United States law in
compliance with the Berne Convention); Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1615 (asserting
that “Dastar goes far in undermining whatever illusion is left of the minimalist”
position on moral rights in the United States).
103. See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(3),
102 Stat. 2853 (1988), codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000).
104. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003)
(citing Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989)).
105. Id. at 35.
106. See Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-33 (1990) (hereinafter VARA) (granting the author of a work of visual art the
right of attribution; the right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation or
other modification of the work prejudicial to the author’s reputation; and the
right to prevent destruction of works of art of a recognized stature), codified in 17
U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
107. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34-35.
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108

Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), the Court was very clearly aware
109
In ignoring
of the obligations under the Berne Convention.
those obligations, the Court reinforced Congress’s attitude by
narrowly interpreting the word “origin.”
The fairly loud scholarly “buzz” about the implications of
Dastar for United States compliance with the Berne Convention
ignores the important fact that the TRIPS Agreement specifically
110
excludes any obligation to protect moral rights.
The United
States insisted on this exclusion during the Uruguay Round
negotiations because it remained unwilling to commit to a strong
111
regime for the protection of moral rights.
Thus, the Dastar
decision, as much as it compromises the protection of moral rights
in the United States, is not subject to the World Trade
112
Organization (WTO) dispute-settlement process. Further, under
principles of international law, the TRIPS Agreement supersedes
113
the Berne Convention. At best, it is an open question whether, as
108. VARA, supra note 106.
109. VARA was enacted pursuant to United States accession to the Berne
Convention. VARA provides limited moral rights protection for works of visual
arts. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
110. TRIPS Agreement, art. 9, supra note 77.
111. Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims under the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357,
379 n.92 (1998).
112. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
113. The more specific agreement prevails in interpretive conflicts between
two treaties. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation:
Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L LAW 619, 644 (1998). For some
support for the proposition that TRIPS supersedes Berne to some extent, see Sam
Ricketson, Copyright and Related Rights in the TRIPS Agreement, available at
http://www.kipo.go.kr/ehtml/eAnnSemi05.html (last visited July 20, 2004); Susan
M. Deas, Jazzing Up the Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the United States
Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS COMM & ENT L.J. 567 (1998) (“Although TRIPs
member nations are required to comply with the Berne Convention requirements,
this requirement is subject to TRIPs ‘signal exception,’ which explicitly states that
Berne Article 6bis moral rights or obligations are excluded from TRIPs’ mandatory
incorporation of Berne Convention provisions.” [citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]);
contra, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 768 (2001) (“In the
area of copyright, the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement form the
overall framework for multilateral protection. Most WTO Members are also parties
to the Berne Convention . . . . [I]t is a general principle of interpretation to adopt
the meaning that reconciles the texts of different treaties and avoids a conflict
between them. Accordingly, one should avoid interpreting the TRIPS Agreement
to mean something different than the Berne Convention except where this is
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between two WTO member states, the United States has an
obligation to protect moral rights. However, as between a WTO
member and a non-WTO member who have both ratified the
Berne Convention, the Article 6bis obligation still applies with full
force.
An important limit to this argument is that Article 2(2) of the
TRIPS Agreement preserves the obligations members have to each
other under existing intellectual property agreements, including
the Berne Convention. From an international law perspective, the
picture that emerges is as follows: countries that never joined the
Berne Convention have no obligation to protect moral rights under
the TRIPS Agreement, and countries that are members of the
WTO and the Berne Convention cannot employ the compliance
mechanism of the WTO to enforce a member’s obligation to
protect moral rights under the Berne Convention. Finally, since
the domestic application of an international treaty is governed
solely by the provisions of the implementing legislation, protection
of moral rights in the United States is available only to the extent
114
that Congress has enacted legislation for such protection.
The
Court in Dastar clearly was aware of the passage of VARA as
Congress’s effort to provide a limited form of moral rights
protection. This suggests that the Court (rightly) was unwilling to
treat the Lanham Act and the Copyright Act as coterminous, nor
explicitly provided for. This principle is in conformity with the public
international law presumption against conflicts, which has been applied by WTO
panels and the Appellate Body in a number of cases.”); Martin D.H. Woodward,
Comment, TRIPS and NAFTA’s Chapter 17: How Will Trade-Related Multilateral
Agreements Affect International Copyright?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 269, 275 (1996) (“The
Berne Convention, then, continues to be of great significance in both TRIPS and
NAFTA; while both agreements exhibit some degree of independence from the
Berne Convention, the paradigms of international copyright protection
established by the Convention remain influential.”) In several significant respects,
the TRIPS Agreement now outflanks and supersedes the provisions of the Berne
Convention. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 59,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 345-46, 8 I.L.M. 679, 700-01 (specifying circumstances under
which newer treaty supersedes older treaty on same subject matter).
114. See § 3(a) of the BCIA: “The Berne Convention (1) shall be given effect
under title 17, as amended by this Act, and any other relevant provision of Federal
or State law, including the common law and, (2) shall not be enforceable in any
action brought pursuant to the provisions of the Berne Convention itself.” Section
4(c) goes on to provide in part that “no right or interest in a work eligible for
protection under this title may be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the
provisions of the Berne Convention or the adherence of the United States
thereto.” Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
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(wrongly) to explicitly consider the exercise of the Treaty Power as
an additional basis to engage in judicial oversight of Congress’s
115
competency.
III. MORE THAN A JURISPRUDENCE OF DEFERENCE?
The Court’s deference at this particular historical moment is
troublesome from another perspective. Copyright legislation is
well known to be a product of interest-group bargaining that
invariably diminishes the voice of a diffuse and loosely organized
public. This public choice problem is being addressed in a variety
116
of ways, particularly through the activities of public interest
groups who seek to counterbalance the influence of the
entertainment industry. Notwithstanding, the legislative process
remains quite vulnerable to pervasive, persistent and economically
powerful organized industries that generally represent copyright
owners’ interests. As other commentators have observed, the
Court’s deference ultimately leads to acquiescence to the extension
of the underlying economic philosophy of the Industrial Age to the
Information Age, namely that strong property interests are an
117
indispensable feature of a “rapidly changing civilization.”
This
suggests not pragmatic instrumentalism, but the Court’s own
acceptance of a core normative vision of copyright law. It is a vision
more about what exclusive proprietary rights mean to the national
economy than what they mean to authors or the public. That vision
must be carefully considered in the combined light of the
Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Treaty Power.
115. The Court’s rigid adherence in Dastar to the boundaries between
copyright, patent, and trademark is also consistent with the weight of precedent
going back to the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Higgens v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428
(1891); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 642
(1834).
116. Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 245-46 (2002) ( “Especially where special interests have
managed to convince Congress to pass legislation that is directly contrary to the
express constitutional purpose, some independent review of the basis for the
legislation is imperative.”); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the
Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 659 (1996) (“The
marketing and concomitant lobbying power of the copyright industries, and their
repeated victories at the expense of individual authors (most particularly in the
work-made-for-hire context) is a clarion call to the Court to read the Copyright
Clause with fresh attention and historical understanding.”).
117. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 263 (1918); Julie E.
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97
MICH. L. REV. 462 (1988); see also Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 42.
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Within the context of the latter, this vision informs global trade
relations and exacerbates the pressure on the domestic legislative
process.
For this reason, I have suggested elsewhere that
mandatory adjudication panels under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) must take seriously the balance
118
between owners and users of public goods.
Specifically, these
panels must develop a jurisprudence of public welfare that will
affirm the importance of the public interest in reasonable access to
protected works, and that can influence domestic policies in favor
119
of a balanced approach to copyright. At the very least, the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism should not contribute to domestic
welfare- distorting applications of the TRIPS Agreement, and
120
should account for correction of domestic government failure.
This outcome is compelled, at least in part, by modern trends in
international law and is facilitative of the welfare goals of
121
international economic policy.
It is also consistent with the
internal constraints of constitutional democracy on the
international legal process, and might help to constrain the global
influence that promotes a one-sided version of “progress” and the
“public good.”
It is not just the public interest that is at stake given the
Supreme Court’s repose in the copyright arena. Rather, the Court’s
role in copyright cases also speaks to the balance between
Congress’s authority over domestic copyright matters, and the
Executive’s exercise of the Treaty Power to negotiate bilateral and
multilateral copyright agreements that may coexist uneasily with
122
established copyright doctrines. Given the global pressures that
123
influence domestic copyright legislation, pressures that the Court
118. See Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819 (2003).
119. Id. at 824.
120. Id. at 838, 913-17.
121. Expressing those goals, the IMF Articles of Agreement’s Article 1,
Purpose, includes “(ii)To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance
of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the
productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.”
IMF Articles of Agreement, art. 1, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/ aa/aa01.htm (last visited July 20, 2004).
122. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (2000) (arguing that the fair use doctrine is in tension with the
Berne three-step test and advocating for an explicit fair use principle in
international copyright law).
123. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts
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alluded to in both Eldred and Dastar, I do not agree that the search
for permanent principles of constitutional probity will lead
inexorably to inflexible or unworkable outcomes for copyright
124
law.
Indeed, I suggest that if the Constitution admits sweeping
congressional powers over copyright with minimal constraints, the
exercise of the Treaty Power in the area of copyright and patent law
125
is of significant concern. In Reid v. Covert, a plurality of the Court
held that the Treaty Power cannot be used to avoid the
Constitution’s affirmative limitation on congressional power—in
126
that case, the Bill of Rights. Thus, the Treaty Power could not be
used to deprive a U.S. citizen of the right to a court trial. However,
127
in the related case of Missouri v. Holland, the Court adverted that
the Treaty Power may be used to accomplish things that are not
otherwise within the power of Congress. If the promotion of
progress and the useful arts is not a limit on Congress’s power, then
Holland would govern and international agreements become a
more powerful agency of legislative change in the domestic arena.
Of course, Congress could, as it often does, limit the reach of an
agreement through the use of implementing legislation, which
then constitutes the only source of the treaty’s domestic
128
application. Where, however, the root issue is Congress’s capture
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 477 (2000) (“[a]lmost every
significant reform of U.S. copyright law over the last twelve years, since the United
States belatedly joined the Berne Convention in 1988, has reflected international
influences” ); Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 39 (2002) (noting that “significant aspects of U.S. copyright
law are influenced by international concerns, and important parts are dictated by
a growing body of public international law obligations”).
124. Leaffer, supra note 21, at 1598.
125. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
126. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
127. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
128. See, e.g., Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191,
195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the scope of United States protection under the
Berne Convention is defined by United States legislation: “Thus, while the
Copyright Act, as amended by the BCIA, extends certain protection to the holders
of copyright in Berne Convention works as there defined, the Copyright Act is the
exclusive source of that protection.” The Berne Convention Implementation Act
states that:
[T]he provisions of the Berne Convention—
(1) shall be given effect under title 17, as amended by this Act,
and any other relevant provision of Federal or State law, including
the common law, and
(2) shall not be enforceable in any action brought pursuant to the
provisions of the Berne Convention itself.
Pub. L. 100-568, § 3, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (1988).
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by special-interest groups, whose influence has proven just as
129
powerful in the international arena, implementing legislation in
fact becomes another opportunity to secure or expand the gains
made internationally, or to weaken or eliminate any public-interest
130
limitations admitted by the treaty.
This was clearly the case with
respect to the World Intellectual Property Organization’s
131
Copyright Treaty, which was implemented very narrowly through
132
The question of how the
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Treaty Power may expand indirectly the Copyright Power is
squarely at issue in Golan. If the Court determines that the object
of the Copyright Clause is a limitation on Congress’s power, then
under the rule in Reid, the scope of congressional power will yet
again be addressed by a lower court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Copyright law recently has taken a place alongside the First
Amendment and Due Process as an area of significant
constitutional importance. Of course, copyright touches both of
these areas and more. The ubiquitousness of copyright in modern
American culture has occasioned an unprecedented economic
influence exerted by the entertainment industry over the legislative
branch, creating a movement of global proportion to limit the
expansion of copyright.
In the United States, the explicit
constitutionalization of intellectual property matters has focused
primarily on the nexus between copyright and the First

Similarly, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act specifies that U.S. law shall prevail
in the event of any conflict with the Uruguay Round Agreements. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102, 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994).
129. Okediji, supra note 118 (analyzing the TRIPS Agreement negotiations
using game theory, and arguing that the WTO dispute-settlement process should
defer to a country’s calculus of public welfare except in cases where the
international forum is used as an excuse to avoid consideration of the public
interest at the domestic level).
130. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property:
Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7
SING. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 315, 374-75 (2003/2004) (suggesting that developing
countries adopt a practice of implementing legislation to strengthen the prospects
that development concerns will be considered in deciding how the treaty will be
incorporated in domestic law).
131. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997).
132. For analysis of the WIPO negotiations and the success of the coalition of
public interest groups and developing countries that opposed the expansionist
digital agenda, see Samuelson, supra note 38.
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133

Amendment.
However, the recent emphasis on constitutional
concerns has been a central part of efforts to insulate traditional
copyright rights (and for that matter intellectual property
generally) from the rapid encroachment of greater propertization.
This movement has not always been accompanied by careful
examination of the ways in which the appeal to constitutional
jurisprudence in any number of areas might actually affect or
influence the Court’s examination of intellectual property policy,
nor of how they should. With the explicit politicization of
copyright policy through interest-group activity, the role of the
Supreme Court is now a significant aspect of the public choice
problem facing advocates of the public domain. But it is also a cry
for the Court to once again assume a dynamic deference,
reminiscent of its brief period in the nineteenth century, which is
faithful to congressional intent without abandoning constitutional
interpretation.
In the words of Justice Holmes, “[a]
Constitution . . . is made for people of fundamentally differing
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and
familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
134
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”

133. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional
Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1011-15, 1017-22 (1970);
Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1 (2001); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
134. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905).
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